Community debate over practical sandboxing solutions emerges
4 Sep 19 11:41 PM · 4d ago · 11 comments · 1 source · development 4 of 5
Thread identifies multiple real-world sandboxing approaches (gVisor donated to CNCF, Firecracker, Kata Containers, bubblewrap, Apple Sandbox) but reveals deep tensions: every tool trades security hardening against usability, and many are either undocumented (Apple Sandbox), hard to configure securely (gVisor, Kubernetes), or difficult to deploy (Firecracker). No consensus emerges on what practitioners should use now.
“My problem with sandboxes is that what I really want is an easy-to-use sandbox from a company with a dedicated security team that works on that sandbox product, and who risk millions (ideally billions) of dollars if it leaks.”
simonwapropos (author of Datasette) Security researcher, post authorSimon Willison (simonw) Datasette maintainer, open-source security expertZ.ai Co. (formerly Zhipu AI) AI model developerjfred (commenter) Security architecture discussantDeAlignAI Model abliteration group
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What people said 11 voices · verbatim
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I've been spending quite a lot of time fixing llm-reported vulnerabilities this year, especially in the last 3 or 4 months. Hopefully at some point, chromium will just "not have bugs", and if introduced they get found quickly before they hit stable. It's a lot of work getting there though lol.
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UI design is definitely a challenge, yeah; capabilities have been more obscure for a while and haven't had as much UI work as more common architectures. Though for what it's worth, things like the file/photo pickers in Android and iOS are capability-style powerboxes that people use every day. I think it's possible to expand on this, but it will…
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I really love [bubblewrap](https://github.com/containers/bubblewrap) for this on Linux. It really does make it simple to run a single command with controlled permissions. You can share and unshare specific parts of the filesystem, as well as control network access with a simple wrapper script. Linux has some seriously powerful tools to do this…
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I wanted to offer that I've had pretty good luck with the (ahem) now deprecated [Apple Sandbox](https://keith.github.io/xcode-man-pages/sandbox.7.html) (way different from Apple Containers, which is, itself, different from `Library/Containers` and `Library/Group Containers`) I'm grateful to iTerm2's build process for turning me onto it…
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I'm fascinated by `sandbox-exec` because it's really good, almost completely undocumented, has been marked as deprecated for *years*, and is increasingly the secret sauce behind all sorts of other sandboxing tech, including that used by OpenAI and Anthropic. I'm hoping Apple eventually notice how important it has become and decide to not deprecate…
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> an easy-to-use sandbox Arguably there is no such thing since the "easy" part is defining the rules and the "hard" part is knowing _which rules_ to define, followed closely by alert-fatigue's sibling whereby one starts out with "deny /", "allow /some/dir" and ends up at "allow /" because it's just too incredibly painful to carve out the actual…
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USB protection doesn’t really matter when it only takes a single host to infect patched up to date systems or if it then adds itself to any healthy usb drive later inserted. Also the centrifuges were air gapped so the usb technology aspect was choosen specifically, and not the standard autorun usb vulnerabilities. I highly recommend the book if…
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also known as "don't plug random hardware into your other random hardware" I am thankful that I mostly remember to bring my own chargers with me, but just in case something goes awry I do actually carry a [usb condom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juice_jacking#Mitigation_by_hardware) with me when I travel
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Thanks a lot. I looked into it a bit. gVisor seems to have an issue where it's capable of exposing a _lot_ of stuff from the host (socket passthrough, device passthrough, host filesystem sharing). Sure I could try to disable everything, but it's hard to know that everything is actually disabled. Kubernetes has this issue too, you can make Pods…
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I believe the issue isn't sandboxing, but data-isolation between environments. Apple gets this right - my terminal can't just my safari data, but it isn't customizable enough to work for arbitrary development or terminal environments. QubesOS is a linux based solution, it has very good isolation but is harder to work with and customize. I have…
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That's the security model used by Android, also (err, without the sudo part) - every app gets its own uid
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