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AIQuiet 12d · day 14

Developer warns frontier AI providers are "pirates" after Navier-Stokes incident

Patrick McCanna argues that OpenAI and Anthropic's data practices make self-hosted LLMs the only privacy-safe option.

What to know

  • Developer Patrick McCanna frames migrating to self-hosted LLMs as a privacy necessity, alleging OpenAI and Anthropic train on sensitive user session metadata to extract novel insights.
  • McCanna accuses frontier providers of security theater and deliberately insecure practices, calling them "pirates" rather than trustworthy partners.
  • Hacker News readers dispute McCanna's analysis, arguing the article conflates technical context-window limitations with privacy concerns and lacks substance on either front.
  • Commenters note that 35KB prompts may represent legitimate structured data architectures, not confused design, and report real-world context usage far exceeding McCanna's claimed limits.

The dispute Whether McCanna's article addresses a real privacy risk or merely recasts a technical limitation (context window incompatibility) as a security issue. · positions read across 16 posts and comments

some voices

McCanna's privacy concerns about frontier providers are justified; self-hosted models are the responsible choice for protecting proprietary reasoning.

  • “If you want to protect your ideas, you cannot run inference on someone else's hardware.”

    Patrick McCanna · patrickmccanna.net ↗
many voices

The article conflates context window technical limits with privacy claims; 35KB prompts are a design problem, not a privacy problem.

  • “if your prompt is 35kb, your prompt is confusing, unfocused, and doesn't work right on any LLM”

    DiabloD3 · Hacker News ↗
many voices

Large prompts are legitimate for complex agent workloads with structured data; real-world context usage often exceeds advertised limits.

  • “It could be sets of data so the agent doesn't have to collect it every time, like program interfaces, commands, views, databases, tables, data models etc.”

    gchamonlive · Hacker News ↗
some voices

The real blocker for local LLM adoption is prohibitive hardware costs, not privacy concerns or software architecture.

  • “The main gotcha for local models is insane hardware requirements. Even for $10K you get mediocre performance.”

    stackedinserter · Hacker News ↗

Patrick McCanna Developer, authorOpenAI Frontier AI providerAnthropic Frontier AI provider

How it unfolded 3 developments, newest first · click a bar or a number to jump articlespostscomments

Peak 12 pieces in 3h at Sep 14, 9 AM; 19 pieces over 14 days (1 article · 2 posts · 16 comments) Sep 14, 9 AM — 12 pieces · 1 article · 2 posts · 9 comments — Hacker News 10, Newswires 1, Mastodon 1Sep 14, 12 PM — 2 pieces · 2 comments — Hacker News 2Sep 14, 3 PM — 1 piece · 1 comment — Hacker News 1Sep 14, 6 PM — 2 pieces · 2 comments — Hacker News 2Sep 14, 9 PM — quietSep 15, 12 AM — 1 piece · 1 comment — Hacker News 1Sep 15, 3 AM — quietSep 15, 6 AM — quietSep 15, 9 AM — quietSep 15, 12 PM — quietSep 15, 3 PM — quietSep 15, 6 PM — quietSep 15, 9 PM — quietSep 16, 12 AM — 1 piece · 1 comment — Hacker News 1Sep 16, 3 AM — quietSep 16, 6 AM — quietSep 16, 9 AM — quietSep 16, 12 PM — quietSep 16, 3 PM — quietSep 16, 6 PM — quietSep 16, 9 PM — quietSep 17, 12 AM — quietSep 17, 3 AM — quietSep 17, 6 AM — quietSep 17, 9 AM — quietSep 17, 12 PM — quietSep 17, 3 PM — quietSep 17, 6 PM — quietSep 17, 9 PM — quietSep 18, 12 AM — quietSep 18, 3 AM — quietSep 18, 6 AM — quietSep 18, 9 AM — quietSep 18, 12 PM — quietSep 18, 3 PM — quietSep 18, 6 PM — quietSep 18, 9 PM — quietSep 19, 12 AM — quietSep 19, 3 AM — quietSep 19, 6 AM — quietSep 19, 9 AM — quietSep 19, 12 PM — quietSep 19, 3 PM — quietSep 19, 6 PM — quietSep 19, 9 PM — quietSep 20, 12 AM — quietSep 20, 3 AM — quietSep 20, 6 AM — quietSep 20, 9 AM — quietSep 20, 12 PM — quietSep 20, 3 PM — quietSep 20, 6 PM — quietSep 20, 9 PM — quietSep 21, 12 AM — quietSep 21, 3 AM — quietSep 21, 6 AM — quietSep 21, 9 AM — quietSep 21, 12 PM — quietSep 21, 3 PM — quietSep 21, 6 PM — quietSep 21, 9 PM — quietSep 22, 12 AM — quietSep 22, 3 AM — quietSep 22, 6 AM — quietSep 22, 9 AM — quietSep 22, 12 PM — quietSep 22, 3 PM — quietSep 22, 6 PM — quietSep 22, 9 PM — quietSep 23, 12 AM — quietSep 23, 3 AM — quietSep 23, 6 AM — quietSep 23, 9 AM — quietSep 23, 12 PM — quietSep 23, 3 PM — quietSep 23, 6 PM — quietSep 23, 9 PM — quietSep 24, 12 AM — quietSep 24, 3 AM — quietSep 24, 6 AM — quietSep 24, 9 AM — quietSep 24, 12 PM — quietSep 24, 3 PM — quietSep 24, 6 PM — quietSep 24, 9 PM — quietSep 25, 12 AM — quietSep 25, 3 AM — quietSep 25, 6 AM — quietSep 25, 9 AM — quietSep 25, 12 PM — quietSep 25, 3 PM — quietSep 25, 6 PM — quietSep 25, 9 PM — quietSep 26, 12 AM — quietSep 26, 3 AM — quietSep 26, 6 AM — quietSep 26, 9 AM — quietSep 26, 12 PM — quietSep 26, 3 PM — quietSep 26, 6 PM — quietSep 26, 9 PM — quietYesterday, 12 AM — quietYesterday, 3 AM — quietYesterday, 6 AM — quietYesterday, 9 AM — quietYesterday, 12 PM — quietYesterday, 3 PM — quietYesterday, 6 PM — quietYesterday, 9 PM — quietToday, 12 AM — quiet 1–3
Sep 15Sep 16Sep 17Sep 18Sep 19Sep 20Sep 21Sep 22Sep 23Sep 24Sep 25Sep 26now · 1:13 AM ET
  1. 3

    Commenters defend large prompts as structured data, not prose confusion

    gchamonlive pushed back against the assumption that large prompts are verbose human text, noting that 35KB could easily be structured metadata—"program interfaces, commands, views, databases, tables, data models"—needed so agents don't have to re-fetch it. This suggests large system prompts may be a legitimate architecture pattern rather than evidence of poor design.

    “You are assuming the entirety of the prompt is human prose, but it could be sets of data so the agent doesn't have to collect it every time, like program interfaces, commands, views, databases, tables, data models etc.”
    — gchamonlive, Hacker News commenter · source
    • > you run out of useful context that the model can accurately attend to around the 250k mark no matter how much they advertise their context size is.This was certainly true when I first tried the new models with a 1M context. After 200k things got weird pretty fast. I haven’t had that problem since Opus 4.8. I’m regularly bumping against 800k…

      lowbloodsugarHacker News13d agoview on Hacker News ↗
    2 more of the top 3 · 9 posts in this stretch
    • I've been using Claude Code Extension in VSCode (no phone-home configured), backed by DwarfStar on a LAN local MBPro 128GB M5. The context bloat is horrendous, leading to 5-10 minute prefills.I've recently been exploring tools like headroom to help manage context, with some limited "success" (for some definition of success). What do others with…

      fghorowHacker News13d agoview on Hacker News ↗
    • Tbf, didn't read the article because it isn't applicable to me. I don't use system prompts or memory, I just use models stock and write the problem out.Is it really 250k? I had a long running autonomous Astra session today that got to about 600k and it finished fine with everything I asked it to do solved nicely. Opus 5 last week got to around…

      birdsongsHacker News13d agoview on Hacker News ↗
    all of them →
  2. 2

    Commenters report context performance beyond advertised limits

    birdsongs reported using autonomous sessions reaching 600K+ tokens with good performance, contradicting claims that useful context maxes out around 250K. Others noted that complex tasks naturally balloon context size, suggesting real-world usage patterns differ significantly from McCanna's assumptions about prompt bloat.

    • The main gotcha for local models is insane hardware requirements.Even for $10K you get mediocre performance.

      stackedinserterHacker News13d agoview on Hacker News ↗
    2 posts in this stretch →
  3. 1

    Hacker News commenters dispute McCanna's technical claims and scope

    Readers pushed back on McCanna's article for lacking substance and technical depth. DiabloD3 argued that 35KB prompts indicate confused, unfocused system design and that practical context window limits are far lower than advertised. SyneRyder summarized the article as a straightforward context-window incompatibility (local models have smaller windows than cloud services) rather than the novel privacy insight McCanna implied. Other commenters noted missing practical solutions for the technical problems described.

    “It's become evident that the frontier providers are not only untrustworthy- but actively devious. If you want to protect your ideas, you cannot run inference on someone else's hardware.”
    — Patrick McCanna, Developer, author · source
    • The article doesn't really describe the problem: if your prompt is 35kb, your prompt is confusing, unfocused, and doesn't work right on any LLM, and is needlessly bloating your context.At this point in time, due to how most people and companies run their inference engine, regardless of the model (yes, this includes the newest from OpenAI and…

      DiabloD3Hacker News13d agoview on Hacker News ↗
    2 more of the top 3 · 5 posts in this stretch
    • > Everyone who begins learning exploitation hits a phase of exploitability grief about 3 month into dedicated, practiced study. They hack something they didn’t think they had the skill to break into and it terrifies them. They’re smart enough to know that, relatively speaking, they are an idiot, and if an idiot can do this then nothing is safe…

      andaiHacker News13d agoview on Hacker News ↗
    • TLDR: Local models have a smaller context window, so your 35kB prompts that worked fine against a hosted 1 Million token window, crash out when you only have a 65K (!) token window locally.I dislike being negative, but I was really hoping for more substance when reading this. It would have been an interesting topic.

      SyneRyderHacker News13d agoview on Hacker News ↗
    all of them →
  4. background

    McCanna accuses OpenAI and Anthropic of security theater — McCanna dismisses recent public statements by OpenAI and Anthropic about AI security risks as misdirection. He argues that frontier providers knowingly run unsandboxed agent fleets and have deliberately chosen not to implement serious security controls, and that their public security warnings serve a different purpose than actual protection. He brands frontier providers as "pirates" rather than legitimate partners.

  5. background

    McCanna characterizes frontier providers as deliberately extracting value from users — McCanna argues that the most valuable information frontier providers collect is not raw user data, but the metadata and reasoning patterns in user sessions—the "intuitions" and problem-solving approaches users apply. He alleges frontier providers intentionally train on user activity to extract novel insights, and that when questioned about retention and training practices, providers can only say "Cannot rule it out."

  6. background

    Developer publishes privacy concerns about frontier AI providers — Patrick McCanna published technical notes on migrating 35KB system prompts from Anthropic's Claude and OpenAI's models to self-hosted Ollama, framing the migration as motivated by privacy risks. He cites recent public drama involving mathematicians and frontier providers around potential training on user activity, and argues that frontier AI companies have become untrustworthy with user data and session metadata.

What people are saying 8 voices from 1 site · best of 16 · verbatim

Still unanswered
  • What is the actual state-of-the-art for context window performance with large prompts, and what improvements are expected in the next year?
  • Can local open-weight models realistically replace cloud providers for privacy-sensitive workloads given current hardware costs?
  • Do frontier providers' terms of service actually permit training on user session data, or is this speculation?