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SecurityQuiet 9d · day 14

Fake Claude Code Extension on Cursor Marketplace Backdoored Up to 5,000 Developers

A trojanized Claude Code VS Code extension lived on Cursor's marketplace for about 12 hours, planting SSH backdoors before Anthropic and Cursor pulled it and traded blame.

Part of a larger narrative

AI Developer Tools Security Crisis

2 stories · since Oct 28 · newest 8d ago — Critical vulnerabilities in AI-integrated development platforms and extensions are exposing developer credentials and enabling unauthorized system access at…

  1. Anthropic Quietly Blocks Claude From Reverse-Engineering Games and Hardware
  2. Fake Claude Code Extension on Cursor Marketplace Backdoored Up to 5,000 Developersyou are here

What to know

  • A fake build of Anthropic's Claude Code VS Code extension, served only through Cursor's marketplace, dropped an attacker SSH key and tried to open remote access on up to 5,000 machines before being pulled.
  • Anthropic and Cursor dispute the framing: both say the official extension and Anthropic's own release channels (OpenVSX, VS Code marketplace) were never compromised, only a fake version on Cursor's marketplace.
  • It remains unknown how attackers obtained access to publish through Cursor's verified account, and a bug in the macOS enablement logic limited real-world impact on Macs without SSH already on.
  • Online reaction split between researchers casting it as an Anthropic supply-chain failure with inadequate disclosure, and others insisting the evidence points to Cursor's marketplace alone being at fault.

The dispute Whether responsibility lies with Anthropic (which some say was effectively hacked and stayed quiet) or solely with Cursor's marketplace (which Anthropic staff and several commenters say is the only channel that was ever compromised). · positions read across 153 posts and comments

many voices

This looks like Anthropic being compromised and not being upfront with customers about it.

  • “Anthropic has not informed customers, and the malicious version was silently deleted the backdoored version without telling anybody”

    nixCraft · Mastodon ↗
many voices

The evidence shows this was exclusively a Cursor marketplace compromise, not an Anthropic breach.

  • “To be clear: Anthropic is on HN clarifying that this was exclusively distributed by the Cursor marketplace to Cursor. It didn't come from Anthropic or any other marketplace.”

    wrs · Lobsters ↗
some voices

The incident is being treated with dark humor / schadenfreude rather than alarm.

some voices

This is a preview of much larger AI-enabled supply-chain attacks to come.

  • “How many distro maintainers are using Claude? ... Fuck it, why not grab some fresh 0days from some AI security companies? This could be the fucking mother lode if you play your cards right.”

    dzwdz · Lobsters ↗

Anthropic Maker of Claude CodeCursor (Anysphere) Operator of the compromised extension marketplaceMichael Truell Cursor CEO (@mntruell)Phorion Security research firm that discovered the backdoorKevin Beaumont (GossiTheDog) Security researcherMicrosoft Security Independent analyst of the malware

Fake Claude Code Extension on Cursor Marketplace Backdoored Up to 5,000 Developers
arstechnica.com

How it unfolded 8 developments, newest first · click a bar or a number to jump articlespostscomments

Peak 61 pieces in 4h at Oct 30, 5 AM; 231 pieces over 14 days (52 articles · 85 posts · 94 comments) Oct 28, 1 PM — 1 piece · 1 post — Mastodon 1Oct 28, 5 PM — quietOct 28, 9 PM — quietOct 29, 1 AM — quietOct 29, 5 AM — quietOct 29, 9 AM — quietOct 29, 1 PM — quietOct 29, 5 PM — quietOct 29, 9 PM — 1 piece · 1 post — X 1Oct 30, 1 AM — 27 pieces · 15 articles · 12 posts — Google News 12, Mastodon 7, Hacker News 3, +2 moreOct 30, 5 AM — 61 pieces · 8 articles · 23 posts · 30 comments — Hacker News 26, Mastodon 20, Lobsters 8, +2 moreOct 30, 9 AM — 59 pieces · 1 article · 16 posts · 42 comments — Lobsters 22, Hacker News 21, Mastodon 12, +2 moreOct 30, 1 PM — 21 pieces · 3 articles · 5 posts · 13 comments — Lobsters 8, Hacker News 6, Mastodon 4, +2 moreOct 30, 5 PM — 12 pieces · 4 articles · 5 posts · 3 comments — Mastodon 6, Hacker News 2, Google News 1, +3 moreOct 30, 9 PM — 17 pieces · 14 articles · 2 posts · 1 comment — Newswires 14, Lobsters 1, Mastodon 1, +1 moreOct 31, 1 AM — 7 pieces · 1 article · 3 posts · 3 comments — Hacker News 3, Bluesky 1, X 1, +2 moreOct 31, 5 AM — 2 pieces · 2 posts — Mastodon 2Oct 31, 9 AM — 1 piece · 1 article — Google News 1Oct 31, 1 PM — 2 pieces · 2 posts — Mastodon 2Oct 31, 5 PM — 2 pieces · 2 posts — Bluesky 2Oct 31, 9 PM — 2 pieces · 2 posts — Bluesky 1, Mastodon 1Nov 1, 1 AM — 4 pieces · 1 article · 1 post · 2 comments — Lobsters 2, Google News 1, Mastodon 1Nov 1, 4 AM — 2 pieces · 2 posts — Bluesky 2Nov 1, 8 AM — quietNov 1, 12 PM — 2 pieces · 2 articles — Google News 1, Mastodon 1Nov 1, 4 PM — quietNov 1, 8 PM — 1 piece · 1 post — Hacker News 1Nov 2, 12 AM — 1 piece · 1 post — Mastodon 1Nov 2, 4 AM — 3 pieces · 2 articles · 1 post — Mastodon 1, Google News 1, Newswires 1Nov 2, 8 AM — 1 piece · 1 post — Bluesky 1Nov 2, 12 PM — quietNov 2, 4 PM — quietNov 2, 8 PM — 1 piece · 1 post — Bluesky 1Nov 3, 12 AM — quietNov 3, 4 AM — quietNov 3, 8 AM — quietNov 3, 12 PM — quietNov 3, 4 PM — quietNov 3, 8 PM — quietNov 4, 12 AM — 1 piece · 1 post — Mastodon 1Nov 4, 4 AM — quietNov 4, 8 AM — quietNov 4, 12 PM — quietNov 4, 4 PM — quietNov 4, 8 PM — quietNov 5, 12 AM — quietNov 5, 4 AM — quietNov 5, 8 AM — quietNov 5, 12 PM — quietNov 5, 4 PM — quietNov 5, 8 PM — quietNov 6, 12 AM — quietNov 6, 4 AM — quietNov 6, 8 AM — quietNov 6, 12 PM — quietNov 6, 4 PM — quietNov 6, 8 PM — quietNov 7, 12 AM — quietNov 7, 4 AM — quietNov 7, 8 AM — quietNov 7, 12 PM — quietNov 7, 4 PM — quietNov 7, 8 PM — quietNov 8, 12 AM — quietNov 8, 4 AM — quietNov 8, 8 AM — quietNov 8, 12 PM — quietNov 8, 4 PM — quietNov 8, 8 PM — quietNov 9, 12 AM — quietNov 9, 4 AM — quietNov 9, 8 AM — quietNov 9, 12 PM — quietNov 9, 4 PM — quietNov 9, 8 PM — quietYesterday, 12 AM — quietYesterday, 4 AM — quietYesterday, 8 AM — quietYesterday, 12 PM — quietYesterday, 4 PM — quietYesterday, 8 PM — quietToday, 12 AM — quietToday, 4 AM — quietToday, 8 AM — quietToday, 12 PM — quietToday, 4 PM — quietToday, 8 PM — quiet 12–78
Oct 29Oct 31Nov 2Nov 4Nov 6Nov 8now · 11:05 PM ET
  1. 8

    Microsoft publishes technical postmortem, confirms Anthropic not the source

    Microsoft's security team analyzes the backdoor's persistence and reconnaissance mechanics and states it confirmed with Anthropic that Anthropic did not develop the malicious package; later coverage (SecurityWeek) details the extension's host reconnaissance and attempted reverse SSH tunnel.

    “It's like confirming the jewelry store didn't smash their own windows…”
    — 0xabad1dea, Mastodon user · source
    1. first by Microsoft, 12d ago

      1 more headline
    • 0xabad1dea@infosec.exchange

      weirded out by Microsoft's security blog being like "we confirmed with Anthropic that they did not develop the malicious package." And the Cursor blog also said something similar. Like, yeah, uh, normally we take it for granted that these things are done by criminals who broke into something. It's like confirming the jewelry store didn't smash…

      0xabad1dea@infosec.exchangeMastodon11d ago237▲view on Mastodon ↗
    2 more of the top 3 · 17 posts in this stretch
    • sydseter.com

      That Anthropic distributes malware without telling us does not come as a surprise: arstechnica.com/security/202... #security #ai

      sydseter.comBluesky11d ago10▲view on Bluesky ↗
    • Fake Claude Code extension puts THOUSANDS of Cursor users at risk A fake Anthropic Claude Code extension slipped into Cursor’s marketplace for 11 HOURS, potentially exposing thousands of users to hackers. The malware contained a hidden backdoor targeting Windows, Mac, and Linux

      @MarioNawfalX11d ago7▲view on X ↗
    all of them →
  2. 7

    Ars Technica reports backdoor was live for nearly 12 hours

    Dan Goodin reports the compromised extension was available for close to 12 hours and that it remains unknown how attackers obtained access to Anthropic's verified Cursor publishing account.

    “It's still unknown how attackers got access to Anthropic's verified Cursor account.”
    — Dan Goodin
    • As far as I can tell, you can't upload directly to Cursor's VSCode extension marketplace and there is no such thing as a "Cursor Marketplace account" (in the relevant sense; there is a separate marketplace not for VSCode extensions that you can upload to, but that's not where the compromised extension lived). You can only upload to OpenVSX, which…

      bakkotsecurity12d ago14▲view on Lobsters ↗
    2 more of the top 3 · 18 posts in this stretch
    • cigitalgem@sigmoid.social

      Dan wrote about the Cursor back door. As Brian chess said this morning, "...this is just vanilla software security. In that sense it's a distraction, but it's hard to get 2026 right if you're still struggling with the lessons from 2006." Right you are, Dr chess. # swsec # appsec # MLsec https:// arstechnica.com/security/2026/…

      cigitalgem@sigmoid.socialMastodon12d ago2▲view on Mastodon ↗
    • You can say that this isn't compromise of Anthropic, but it sort of is in the setup. Cursor Claude extension is marked as something made by Anthropic, so default assumption is that only people who can release that new extension would be a team at Anthropic.Since that is clearly not the case, that is just as much Anthropic's problem as it is…

      tzoneHacker News12d agoview on Hacker News ↗
    all of them →
  3. 6

    Anthropic staff clarify the malicious build never touched official channels

    Anthropic employee Dworken states on Hacker News that version 2.1.313 was never published on OpenVSX, the VS Code marketplace, or any official host, and that Anthropic skipped that version number and shipped 2.1.314 to disambiguate.

    “1.313 was never published on OpenVSX, the VS Code marketplace, or on any of our official hosts. The malicious actor here had published a fake version of this extension on Cursor's marketplace.”
    — Dworken (Anthropic)
    • To be clear: Anthropic is on HN clarifying that this was exclusively distributed by the Cursor marketplace to Cursor. It didn’t come from Anthropic or any other marketplace. The perpetrators incremented the version number to get it to update, so Anthropic skipped that version number and released a new one, but the malware was never in their…

      wrssecurity12d ago35▲view on Lobsters ↗
    2 more of the top 3 · 59 posts in this stretch
    • jik@federate.social

      This is the best coverage I've found so far of the Claude Code for VS Code backdoor: https://www. stepsecurity.io/blog/claude-co de-extension-trojanized The compromised version made it into all of the extension registries. Don't be misled by the fact that it was discovered first in the Cursor registry; this does _not_ just impact Cursor users, it…

      jik@federate.socialMastodon12d ago7▲view on Mastodon ↗
    • This is from the Cursor blog [1] linked in the description, but repeating it here because I found it useful:---Check whether you are impactedThe malicious extension appends the attacker's public key, labeled svc-telemetry, to your SSH authorized keys. To check for it:On macOS, run: grep -qs svc-telemetry ~/.ssh/authorized_keys && echo…

      jonas21Hacker News12d agoview on Hacker News ↗
    all of them →
  4. 5

    Researchers accuse Anthropic of staging a supply-chain attack, no customer notice

    Security researcher Kevin Beaumont (GossiTheDog) publishes a post calling it a global supply-chain compromise and says Anthropic silently deleted the backdoored version without informing customers, fueling wide social alarm.

    “Anthropic has not informed customers, and the malicious version was silently deleted the backdoored version without telling anybody…”
    — nixCraft (quoting DoublePulsar)
    • nixCraft@mastodon.social

      Yesterday, Anthropic were compromised and Cursor extension used by tens of millions of developers for Claude access was delivering a remote access trojan via an SSH reverse backdoor. The malware allowed hands on and automated remote access to developer laptops and desktops, in a supply chain attack. Anthropic has not informed customers, and the…

      nixCraft@mastodon.socialMastodon12d ago368▲view on Mastodon ↗
    2 more of the top 3 · 48 posts in this stretch
    • lol. lmao. If this is true, then this is way too good of a supply chain attack to waste on [some mere $6b crypto theft](https://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/117529440075662184). How many distro maintainers are using Claude? Even these from "conservative" distros like Debian, which would usually be relatively hard to attack? How many folks are…

      dzwdzsecurity12d ago72▲view on Lobsters ↗
    • So if this happened to OpenAI it would've been instantly auto-updated everywhere? VS Code has an "auto update delay" which I have configured to a week, but I just found out that (https://code.visualstudio.com/updates/v1_123):> Note: This delay does not apply to extensions from trusted publishers such as Microsoft, GitHub, and OpenAI. These…

      orlpHacker News12d agoview on Hacker News ↗
    all of them →
  5. 4

    Cursor CEO disputes that the 'official' extension was compromised

    Michael Truell pushes back on framing from an earlier post, saying Cursor does not believe the official Claude Code VS Code extension itself was compromised.

    “We've spoken with the author of this blog and do not believe the official Claude Code VS Code extension was compromised. We believe this is instead a report of this incident.”
    — @mntruell
    • GossiTheDog@cyberplace.social

      Anthropic got compromised. Their Claude Code extension on Visual Studio has malware in it, which creates a remote access Trojan to desktops. https:// phorion.io/blog/offical-claude -code-vsx-compromise/

      GossiTheDog@cyberplace.socialMastodon12d ago2.5k▲view on Mastodon ↗
    2 more of the top 3 · 7 posts in this stretch
    • @mattjay We've spoken with the author of this blog and do not believe the official Claude Code VS Code extension was compromised. We believe this is instead a report of this incident.

      @mntruellX12d ago122▲view on X ↗
    • "Phorion has detected a backdoor in the official Claude Code for VS Code extension bundle on Open VSX that drops a persistent SSH backdoor across macOS, Linux, and Windows. This write-up focuses primarily on macOS, where the extension attempts to configure an SSH backdoor and establish persistence. Organisations should immediately review their…

      graste@vivaldi.netMastodon12d ago14▲view on Mastodon ↗
    all of them →
  6. 3

    Cursor says incident hit at most 5,000 users, not Anthropic's code

    Cursor's official account states the malicious version was accessed through its marketplace, was not developed by Anthropic, and did not affect other extensions.

    “We identified a security incident affecting a modified Claude Code VS Code extension accessed through our Cursor IDE extension marketplace, impacting at most 5,000 users.”
    — @cursor_ai
    1. first by Business Today, 11d ago · also Digit, The Decoder, Reuters, Business Standard, Channel News Asia, Elets CIO +3

      8 more headlines
    2. first by Dark Reading, 12d ago

    • We identified a security incident affecting a modified Claude Code VS Code extension accessed through our Cursor IDE extension marketplace, impacting at most 5,000 users. This malicious version of the extension was not developed by Anthropic. It does not impact other extensions

      @cursor_aiX12d ago4.1k▲view on X ↗
  7. 2

    Phorion publishes backdoor discovery; Cursor pulls the versions

    Security firm Phorion details an injected payload that writes an attacker Ed25519 key to authorized_keys, sets up persistence, and beacons host recon data, across macOS, Linux and Windows; Cursor removes 2.1.312/2.1.313.

    “Phorion has discovered a compromise of the official Claude Code for VS Code extension on the Cursor Marketplace, where the backdoored extension bundle contains a persistent Secure Shell (SSH) backdoor.”
    — Phorion
    • The official Claude code VS Code extension was compromised and pulling it would’ve installed an ssh backdoor on your machine for a brief window today.

      @mattjayX12d ago1.9k▲view on X ↗
    1 more of the top 2 · 2 posts in this stretch
    • firusvg@mastodon.social

      "The official # Claude Code # VSCode extension was compromised today. Yes, you heard that right." Trojanized # ClaudeCode Extension Plants an SSH Backdoor https:// opensourcemalware.com/blog/tro janized-claude-code-extension-plants-persistent-ssh-backdoor # WTF # AI # malware # security

      firusvg@mastodon.socialMastodon12d ago6▲view on Mastodon ↗
    all of them →
  8. 1

    Malicious extension circulates on Cursor's marketplace for ~11-12 hours

    Versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 of the Claude Code VS Code extension, modified to include a backdoor, were served through the Cursor Marketplace before being pulled.

    1. first by Unite.AI, 11d ago · also RuntimeWire, The Hacker News, Help Net Security, The Register, Notebookcheck, Northeast Times

      8 more headlines
    2. first by OX Security, 12d ago · also Rescana, Step Security, Firstpost, Sophos, BleepingComputer, India Today

      6 more headlines
    4 more claims →
    • catsalad

      RE: https:// cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog /117519256602179261 PHP demystified

      catsaladMastodon14d ago33▲view on Mastodon ↗

Also covered reported alongside — the timeline has no entry for these yet

  1. first by Mastodon, 12d ago · also HN Best, HN Frontpage, DoublePulsar

    2 more headlines
  2. first by BigGo Finance, 12d ago · also HN Best, HN Frontpage

    1 more headline

and 1 smaller piece

What people are saying 10 voices from 5 sites · best of 153 · verbatim

Still unanswered
  • How did attackers get access to publish through Cursor's verified marketplace account?
  • Was any other software besides the Claude Code extension affected by the same access?
  • Did the attackers use the backdoor to pivot into other systems (e.g., distro maintainers, AI security firms) before discovery?